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Abstract 
 
An Electronic Health Record (EHR) is designed to store diverse data accurately from a range of health care providers and 
to capture the status of a patient by a range of health care providers across time. Realising the numerous benefits of the 
system, EHR adoption is growing globally and many countries invest heavily in electronic health systems. In Australia, the 
Government invested $467 million to build key components of the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record 
(PCEHR) system in July 2012. However, in the last three years, the uptake from individuals and health care providers has 
not been satisfactory. Unauthorised access of the PCEHR was one of the major barriers.  We propose an improved access 
control model for the PCEHR system to resolve the unauthorised access issue. We discuss the unauthorised access issue 
with real examples and present a potential solution to overcome the issue to make the PCEHR system a success in 
Australia. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, modern technology has 
increasingly being used in the healthcare sector in order to 
enhance the quality and the cost efficiency of the 
healthcare services. EHR is one of them. In most parts of 
the developed world, healthcare has evolved to a point 
where patients have more than one healthcare provider. 
This has resulted in the growing need to create an 
integrated infrastructure for the collection of diverse 
medical data for healthcare professionals, where the 
adoption of standardised Electronic Health Record (EHR) 
has become imminent. An EHR is a summary of health 
events usually drawn from several electronic medical 
records and may consist of the elements that are 
eventually shared in a national EHR [1], [2]. An online 
EHR enables patients to manage and contribute to their 
own medical notes in a centralised way which greatly 
facilitates the storage, access and sharing of personal 
health data. It is clear that storing medical records 
digitally on the cloud offers great promise for increasing 
the efficiency of the healthcare system. 
1.1.  Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Record (PCEHR) 
A national EHR was introduced to Australia in 2012 and 
the Government has invested multi millions of dollars to 
build key components of the Personally Controlled 
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Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) to improve health 
outcomes and reduce costs for health in the country [3].  
However the take-up by individuals (patients or 
consumer) and health care providers of the PCEHR 
system has been inadequate. The government has failed to 
meet a self-set target of 500,000 registrations of its 
PCEHR by July 1, 2013 [4], doctors have uploaded just 
41,998 shared health summaries onto these records (more 
than 2 million e-health records are empty) and the scheme 
has so far cost taxpayers more than $ 1 billion to develop, 
or almost $24,000 per shared health summary [5].  
The questions still remain, why the PCEHR has not met 
its targets and the take-up did not reach the expectations. 
First of all, setting up an EHR system faces many 
challenges which ultimately impede its wider adoption. A 
privacy and confidentiality concern is one of the top ones. 
Addressing these concerns to win individuals mindset is 
crucial. Once patients’ personal health data are stored in 
the cloud or local server with PCEHR, it is not quite clear 
who else can access it other than the patient’s usual 
doctor. For example, with the current system, in a health 
care provider organisation, all other health care providers 
working for the organisation can access patient clinical 
information. There are also instances where 
administration staff may access patients’ clinical 
information for improving the business (e.g. targeting 
chronic disease high risk or pap smear patients, who are 
due for a reminder) [6]. Externally it is also not sure who 
can access those data once it is stored. Department of 
Health (DOH) in [7] points out that there are very limited 
circumstances where anyone, including the Government, 
may access someone’s PCEHR documents. This 
statement makes more uncertainty for individuals.  
Consequently, consumers want evidence that their 
personal health information is protected and remain 
confidential when stored on the PCEHR. Consumers have 
argued that ‘the best way to protect privacy is for 
consumers to have ultimate control over who has access 
to their record [8]. 
Consumers also find difficulties in accessing their 
health information from EHR or electronic medical 
records. Sometimes, they must pay to access their own 
health information. This is frustrating, and the current 
PCEHR system must resolve this issue and give free 
access to their own health information. Overwhelmingly, 
consumers want to have access to their own records [8]. 
However the current PCEHR system did not reach that far 
yet. However, on the other hand, consumer should not be 
given permission to modify or remove uploaded 
documents for themselves. Once the document is 
uploaded for a patient whether it is Shared Health 
Summary or Event Summary (ES), the patient can only 
view (read only mode) the details. Patients cannot modify 
any details in it because when health care providers create 
records it is turned to Clinical Document Architecture 
(CDA) type which is non-changeable format like Portable 
Document Format (PDF).  
With the current arrangement of the PCEHR, the 
patients cannot modify the information that is in their 
record, however they could delete the whole record [9] as 
shown in Figure 1 below. This is again an arguable matter 
for the health care providers. Once the health care 
provider and the patient decide the information is valid 
and useful for future treatment and then uploaded, why 
then does the patient have the option to delete the whole 
SHS or ES from their record?. Health care providers, 
therefore argue, how can they depend on the records when 
options available for patients to remove the records.  
 
 
Figure 1: Option for a Patient 
On the other hand, the Department of Health (DOH) 
justifies [8] that it is patients’ record; hence the patients 
are able to remove a document or information about 
prescribed medications or other treatment from the record.  
As mentioned in Figure 2, the patients also have control 
to restrict some health care provider organisations from 
viewing any or all of the record(s) from the PCEHR. This 
is again questionable for health care providers. 
 
 
Figure 2: Patient Option to give Restrict Access 
 
The DOH explains [10] this control gives option for 
patients who can access their record. However health care 
providers worry that the useful health information will not 
be accessible for the effective treatment, even in an 
emergency if they block something relevant.  
This ability of the patient to hide aspects of their record 
is, finally, not only incomplete and uncertain of the health 
Australian PCEHR system: Ensuring Privacy and Security through an Improved Access Control Mechanism 
3 
information integrity, but it becomes a significant clinical 
risk. David Glance [11] mentioned that the first problem 
is the system still represents a “scrapbook” approach to a 
clinical record. There is no guarantee that all the health 
professionals involved in the care of a patient will 
participate and supply information, or that the information 
supplied will be complete.  
Australian Medical Association [12] details that the 
personal record is only a “memory prompt” for the patient 
and that “remains the treating medical practitioner’s 
responsibility to take a clinical history from their patient”. 
This means again, a doctor cannot rely on the health 
record to make clinical decision and the benefit of the 
system would be limited. A SHS or ES would be 
beneficial if the record is a fully distributed and shareable 
clinical record that all health care providers involved in 
the care of the patient would have access to the record or 
could appropriate access when necessary.        
It is important to acknowledge and investigate these 
challenges and shortcomings associated with the current 
electronic health information system and to determine 
possible solutions to ensure its wide adoption and the 
success of the PCEHR system in Australia.   
1.2. Access Control of the PCEHR   
There is significant concern about the privacy of data on 
PCEHR and its potential misuse [13]. In healthcare 
organisations, there are non-clinical staff, such as 
administration staff who may need to access clinical 
related information including PCEHR to target patients to 
increase the organisation’s business. For example, the 
practice follows up with health checks due and reminds 
mainstream patients or identified chronic disease high risk 
patients of the need for consultations. In these 
circumstances, administration staff may access clinical 
information. This access may lead to internal abuse. 
Therefore, administration staff accessing clinical 
information is a high risk.  
Furthermore the system operator of the PCEHR who 
manages the system may intentionally leak patients’ 
clinical information. The access control currently in use 
does not prevent this kind of breach. 
In computer security, access control covers 
authentication, authorisation and audit. Access control 
systems provide the important services of identification, 
authentication, authorisation and accountability to enter 
into an application or system. Identification and 
authentication determine who can log into a system (the 
system may be an application or even an operating 
system). Authorisation provides different privileges for a 
system (usually categorised high-level, medium-level and 
low-level) in accordance with the employee’s role in a 
health care organisation. Finally the accountability 
identifies the subject a user worked on during his or her 
log-in. 
1.3. Our Contribution   
We review and understand previous attacks and methods 
utilised to obtain sensitive health information from 
databases. This will assist to implement an improved 
access control disclosure method in the future (Section 2). 
We discuss access control problem with real world 
examples when using the PCEHR systems in a health care 
provider organisation environment (Section 3). We 
propose an appropriate access control mechanism that 
could be used in Australian health care settings to 
improve privacy and security. This model will prevent 
unauthorised access and misuse within health care 
provider organisations. Initial development of the 
proposed model is explained with a sample computer 
programming language to allow a super user to give 
permission for usual users to access sensitive health 
information in day to day activities. A Mobile Security 
System (MSS) is also suggested for the communication 
between super users and users to ensure prompt 
uninterrupted permission (Section 4). Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper with future research directions. 
2. Related Work 
There are different access control strategies for Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) and EHR that have been 
developed in the past [14].  
According to one Forrester study, 80% of data security 
and privacy breaches involve insiders, employees or those 
with internal access to an organisation, putting 
information at risk [15]. With health sensitive data, this 
risk becomes more prominent. Many researchers have 
proposed various resolutions to solve the security and 
privacy problems associated with the EMRs and EHRs. 
These problems mainly refer to access control. The term 
“access control” is simply defined as “the ability to permit 
or deny the use of something by someone” [15]. The key 
objective of access control mechanisms is to permit 
authorised users to manipulate data and thus maintain the 
privacy of data [16]. There are different access control 
mechanisms that have been identified in the literature 
review. The basic models of the access control principles 
are i) Discretionary Access Control (DAC), ii) Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC), iii) Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) and iv) Purpose Based Access Control (PBAC). 
However, the development is not satisfactory enough to 
fulfil the privacy requirements of EMRs and EHRs [17].  
DAC uses access restriction set by the owner and 
restricts access to the objects. However a user who is 
allowed to access an object by the owner of the object has 
the capability to pass on the access right to other users 
without the involvement of the owner of the object [18]. 
Because of this granting, read access transitive, the 
policies are open for Trojan Horse Attack [19].  
MAC is a set of security and privacy policies 
constrained according to system classification, 
configuration and authentication. The policies made by a 
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central authority [20]. Compared to DAC, MAC policy 
can prevent a Trojan Horse Attack and the integrity of the 
data objects can be protected by using the “Read Up” and 
“Write Down” Rules. In MAC, the individual owner of an 
object has no right to control the access. Therefore, MAC 
policy fails to preserve the privacy requirement for EHRs 
of the patients [21] 
In RBAC [19], each user’s access right is determined 
based on user roles and the role-specific privileges 
associated with them. RBAC policy uses the need-to-
know principle to assign permissions to roles and to fulfil 
the least privileged condition by the system administrator. 
However, RBAC does not integrate other access 
parameters or related data that are significant in allowing 
access to the user [22]. PBAC is based on the notion of 
relating data objects with purposes [23]. Many researchers 
have identified that greater privacy preservation is 
possible by assigning objects with purposes [24]. 
However, Al-Fedaghi describes [25] that PBAC leads to a 
great deal of complexity at the access control level.  
In addition to access control mechanisms, it is also 
important to identify the spectrum of attacks or misuse 
that could be performed by attackers. A wide range of 
attacks have been documented in the literature. It is 
essential to know the different possible attacks for health 
based databases, in order to design a suitable health data 
security system. To achieve this goal the literature review 
has been performed to discuss different main attacks that 
health based databases currently face.  
In the British Computer Society website at 
http://www.bcs.org/server.php?show=ConWebDoc.8852, 
Amichai Schulman and Imperva say “enterprise database 
infrastructures, which often contain the crown jewels of 
an organisation, are subject to a wide range of attacks” 
[26]. 
The reviewing and understanding of previous attacks 
will assist to prevent the access control disclosure in the 
future.  Following main methods utilised to obtain 
sensitive health information from databases.  
1. Excessive privilege granted to staff 
2. Privilege abuse 
3. Unauthorised privilege elevation 
4. Platform vulnerabilities 
5. SQL injection 
6. Weak audit 
7. Weak authentication 
8. Exposure of back-up data 
With excessive privilege, healthcare organisation 
application users are granted privileges that may exceed 
the requirements of their role.  As an example, a 
reception/ administrative staff member whose job requires 
name, contact details and time of the appointments of a 
patient, may be able to view clinical notes of patients. 
Healthcare application users may abuse legitimate data 
access privileges for unauthorised purposes. This is 
known as ‘privilege abuse’.  
Unauthorised privilege elevation means that the 
attackers may take advantage of vulnerabilities in health 
based cloud software systems to convert low-level access 
privileges to high-level access privileges. For instance, an 
attacker may take advantage of cloud based system buffer 
overflow vulnerability to grant administrative privileges. 
Platform vulnerability is taking advantage of the 
vulnerabilities in underlying operating systems, which 
may lead to unauthorised data access or corruption. The 
blaster worm took advantage of a Windows 2000 
vulnerability to take down target servers [27].  
Users may take advantage of vulnerabilities in front-end 
web applications and stored procedures to send 
unauthorised database queries. This is known as “SQL 
injection”.   
Weak audit policy and technology represents risks in 
terms of compliance, deterrence, detection, forensics and 
recovery.  In other words, the cloud based health system 
software provides weak audit solutions itself. These 
products very rarely log the detail about what application 
was used; the source IP address and what queries failed.  
Weak authentication allows attackers to assume the 
identity of legitimate database users. Most of the time, the 
users use their name, personal identification, meaningful 
words or plain text as a password. 
In most situations, people protect the main cloud based 
health database, not actual back-ups.  With exposure of 
back-up data, attacks have involved theft of database 
backup tapes and hard disks. 
3. Access Control and PCEHR 
A good information security must have following three 
main characteristics [28], [29]: 
 Confidentiality – the prevention of  unauthorised     
disclosure of the  information. 
 Integrity – the prevention of  unauthorised 
modification of the  information. 
 Availability – the prevention of  unauthorised 
withholding of the  information.  
Privacy is the right of an individual to not have their 
private information exposed, whilst confidentiality is 
limiting access to information to authorised individuals 
only. Confidentiality is often used interchangeably with 
privacy but they are not exactly the same. 
For an EHR, as a secure information system which 
holds very sensitive and useful health information, 
obligating the above characteristics is paramount. These 
characteristics must ensure security and smooth 
operations of the following three stages of an EHR: 
 to add health information  for a patient by  all 
involved health care providers. 
 to protect the information holding of a patient 
while storing. 
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 to ensure availability of the information when 
required by health care providers. 
Maintaining above three stages for an EHR is a big 
challenge. The system must make it easy for an authorised 
user to gain access to the information whilst preventing 
unauthorised access.  
In order to securely access information within 
information systems identification (e.g. username), 
authentication (e.g. password) and authorisation (e.g. 
access rights) are required. Access control is conceptually 
part of the authorisation process that checks if a user can 
access the information that requested. 
Health care provider organisations use the PCEHR 
through their clinical software systems. The software 
systems use DAC and MAC access control principles. 
RBAC is also used in those systems however PBAC is not 
in use in many healthcare systems because of the 
complexity at the access level. Furthermore, considering 
the current privacy and security issues associated with 
health records, a single access control principle is 
inadequate to protect the highly sensitive information. 
Thus, it is crucial to use a combination of more than one 
access control principle in this environment. When 
administration staff access clinical information from the 
system where RBAC is switched on, the purpose of the 
access is not mentioned. To solve this issue, an 
authorisation from an authority must be given to access 
the information. Then a combination of RBAC and PBAC 
must be applied for a secure access. This means, if an 
administration staff wants to access the clinical 
information, a high-level management staff must give 
permission every time. The high-level management staff 
might be a doctor or a nurse or practice manager who has 
high-level privilege to access all components of the health 
record. This requires both access control principles RBAC 
and PBAC to access the proposed model and it will 
satisfy the requirement. 
In a healthcare provider organisation or an organisation 
that manages the PCEHR system, it is not clear who 
accesses what information within the organisation. In a 
general practice (medium or large) environment in 
Australia, organisations normally use two types of 
software systems to deal with patients. One is the Patient 
Management System (PMS) that assists with appointment 
and billing related activities. This is also known as 
‘billing system’. The other is for managing clinical 
associated activities and recording medical information 
which is called ‘clinical system’. Most general practice 
software systems are integrated with both systems clinical 
and billing. In some cases, the same product has two 
different software systems that are compatible and work 
together to manage both clinical and billing activities. If 
an organisation uses different software systems for billing 
and clinical, then assigning access control is easier. For 
instance, reception staff has access to the billing system 
and not to the clinical system. On the other hand, 
clinicians including doctors and nurses access both 
clinical and PMS but not billing. However, if an 
organisation uses an integrated one system for both billing 
and clinical, then the issues associated with access control 
becomes complicated. However there are situations, 
where healthcare organisations manage this issue by 
giving permission levels based on the roles and purposes. 
The software itself manages these permission controls. 
4. Proposed Model and Development 
In health care organisations current settings, considering 
the financial benefit to the organisation, non-clinical staff 
such as administration staff accessing clinical information 
including PCEHR documents cannot just be ignored. 
Thus, on the other hand, it is a high risk when the staff 
accessing the PCEHR can intentionally leak patients’ 
clinical information. The access control currently in use 
does not prevent this kind of breach. There should be, 
consequently, a strong access control mechanism in place, 
which promises to prevent unauthorised access of the 
PCEHR. We strongly believe our new concept “Log-in-
Pair” would be an ideal answer to protect or minimise the 
unauthorised disclosure.  The development of the “Log-
in-Pair” model is also explained with a sample coding in 
this section below. 
To prevent unauthorised access and/ or disclosure to the 
PCEHR system, the “Log-in-Pair” could be used. In this 
model, to access health information, an employee who has 
top level privilege (called “super user”) has to give 
authorisation to a user to access the health sensitive data. 
Hence, the super user keeps track of what the user does 
with the sensitive data. The users are well-known that the 
super-users have given permission to access the sensitive 
information and they can keep track of what is being 
accessed. It is like a counter check. The responsibility and 
the accountability are shared.  
The “Log-in-Pair” proposed model covers both access 
control principles RBAC and PBAC to access sensitive 
clinical information including PCEHR documents. Thus, 
the proposed model will not only ensure a higher level of 
security but will also resolve the unauthorised access 
problem that previously discussed in Section 2. 
In this setting, every user has their own individual user 
identity and password (alternatively the same credentials 
that user uses for the clinical system can be used) to enter 
into the system. In this pair log-in concept, see Table 1 
below, for user A to enter into the system the super user D 
or E or F will receive an alert to give permission. The 
permission may simply be a touch on their mobile phone 
using MSS. In this example, a healthcare organisation 
with three users (A, B and C) and three super-users (D, E 
and F) is considered. 
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Table 1: Basic pair design 
Pair  Users & Super Users 
1 A & D or E or F 
2 B & D or E or F 
3 C & D or E or F 
The log-in page is designed to accept input from a user 
and then to send an alert to the assigned super-users. 
Assigning more than one super-user will save time and 
give more certainty for a user. The security assurance in 
this system is that one person cannot function on their 
own to access the sensitive information from the PCEHR. 
If a user needs to access the system, they must obtain a 
super-user permission. This arrangement must prevent 
unauthorised access and abuse of the PCEHR. 
This system has its own problems. The following 
problems have been identified in the proposed model. 
Table 2 below illustrates the identified problems with the 
proposed system and potential solutions for those 
problems.  
Table 2: Identified problems and the solutions of 
the proposed model 
Problem  Solution 
If all super users are 
absent (D, E and F), a 
user cannot access the 
system and complete the 
routine activities. 
MSS helps to send alerts to 
super users’ mobile devices. 
Even though they are on 
leave it is possible for them 
to give permission through 
the mobile devices e.g. 
mobile phone. Assigning 
more than one super-user 
for a user also will increase 
the accessibility. 
The system cannot 
prevent if both user and 
super-user choose to 
abuse the sensitive data. 
System Monitoring Facility 
(SMF) that suggested as 
future development in 
Section 5 should detect 
these sorts of abuses. 
Accessing more than one 
user at a time could 
create potential 
bottleneck issues of the 
system. 
The system itself must be 
notified and does not give 
access to other users to 
avoid bottlenecks and 
unnecessary delays in 
logging on the system e.g. 
auto tracking   
If doctors and nurses are 
potential “gatekeepers” 
(super-users), these 
professions are already 
extremely busy, and 
likely to create users 
circumventing the 
system. 
The super-users can simply 
give the permission by one 
touch on their mobile screen 
from anywhere.     
Every non-clinical user who need to access clinical 
information and the PCEHR must be assigned to a super-
user. The source code to create a super-user for each user 
is illustrated in Code 1.  
 
 
Code 1: Creating super-user and the verification 
process 
The verification process that the code 1 includes will 
check that the user and the super-user pair are correct 
before the permission request has been sent.  
 A MSS would be a best solution for this new concept. 
Once the mobile security two-factor authentication is 
enrolled, the user logs into the system using their usual 
username and password. Then the super-user receives a 
message through the device for the permission.  The 
permission could be given via Short Message Service 
(SMS), voice call, one-time pass code or a mobile smart 
phone apps.  
For example, ‘Duo’ MSS [30] has its own smart phone 
app to do the two-factor authentication verification 
process. The system also lets super-user link multiple 
devices to the account such as mobile phone and a 
landline, a landline and hardware token or two different 
mobile devices [30].  This will provide increased 
accessibility for super-users and prompt and more certain 
access for users.  As mentioned in Figure 3 below, the 
MSS will provide an additional security layer for the 
Private Sub cmdok_Click() 
bcheck = checkdata 
usertype = Left(cmbUsertype.Text, 1) 
 If bcheck = checkdata Then 
rs.Open "select * from usertable where userid='" + 
txtuser.Text + "'", cn 
        If Not rs.EOF And Not rs.BOFThen 
MsgBox "This user already exists", , "HighSec System" 
        Else 
newpwd = encryptdata(txtpassword.Text, newkey) 
newpwd = txtpassword.Text 
ssql = "insert into usertable (userid,pwd,usertype) 
values('" + txtuser.Text + "','" + newpwd + "','" + 
usertype + "')" 
InputBox "", ,ssql 
 
cn.Executessql 
            If usertype = "N" Then 
ssql = "insert into groupuser (user1,user2) values('" + 
txtuser.Text + "','" + cmbManager.Text + "')" 
cn.Executessql 
            End If 
ans = MsgBox("User created succesfully. " + vbCrLf + " 
Do you want to close this window?", vbYesNo) 
            If ans = vbYes Then 
                Unload Me 
            Else 
txtuser.Text = "" 
txtpassword.Text = "" 
            End If 
        End If 
rs.Close 
    End If 
End Sub 
 
Private Sub Form_Load() 
ssql = "select * from usertable where usertype='M'" 
rs.Openssql, cn 
While Notrs.EOF 
cmbManager.AddItemrs(0) 
rs.MoveNext 
Wend 
rs.Close 
cmbUsertype.ListIndex = 0 
End Sub 
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PCEHR system. The username and password that has 
been created for the system remain the same and once 
provided, the super-user approval request will be sent out 
to the super-user preferred communication device/s. 
Consequently, if a user (non-clinical staff in a health care 
provider organisation) wants to access patients’ sensitive 
health information for any reason (e.g. targeting high 
chronic disease patients to send a reminder), then an 
authorised person (super-user) must give permission.   
Figure 3: How a mobile security system works 
(source: [30]) 
When creating user login for a user to access health care 
providers’ clinical software, a super-user’s connection 
must be established as illustrated through the above 
computer program code (Code 1)   
Moreover a super-user has more than one option to 
approve or deny the user login request. For example, the 
following options are available with Duo mobile security 
system. 
 
Figure 4: Authentication methods 
Figure 4 above illustrates three various options that are 
available for super-users to give permission for users by 
Duo MSS. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we have introduced a new concept called 
‘Log-in-Pair’ to ensure privacy and security of the 
PCEHR system. Improving privacy and security of the 
system will guarantee the success of the system in 
Australia. We believe the ‘Log-in-Pair’ concept will be 
the ideal answer to minimise misuse and/or abuse within 
our healthcare organisations. Even though access control 
is the first and basic security level for any computer 
system, it is important to make sure that the level of 
protection is strong. Although the proposed method seems 
easy to implement, in practice, there will be more 
concerns when this concept is in use. However, we feel 
this concept could be implemented through education of 
policies and procedures. Ultimately, it would be one of 
the better solutions in maintaining and practicing a high 
security system in a healthcare environment. Mobile 
security system will ensure efficiency of the 
communication between users and super-users of the 
access control level. The super-users such as doctors, 
practice managers and nurses are extremely busy and are 
often unable to view computer screen continuously to 
give permission when needed. Thus, mobile security 
system can be communicated via mobile phones (alerts / 
SMSs) or other mobile devices to give the requested 
permission. The mobile security system also increases 
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed model. A 
System Monitor Facility (SMF) would be beneficial to 
monitor users’ activities within the PCEHR system and to 
maintain audit controls.  The SMF will increase the level 
of security for access control as well. Therefore, 
developing a SMF system and creating an appropriate 
policy and procedure document to maintain the design of 
the ‘Log-in-Pair’ and to monitor the SMF need to be 
considered for future development. 
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